feat(crypto): explicit device-approval flow + dev userData isolation

Disable the previous auto-share of conversation keys to newly-registered
devices: a stolen password / new device registered by an attacker no
longer automatically grants history access. Backup-Restore (which
restores the old device-id) still opens existing wraps as before.

Phase 1 of the approval replacement:
- New `lib/deviceApproval.ts`: realtime listener for `devices` INSERT,
  surfaces a pending list, persists approve/deny decisions in
  `chatapp.approvedDeviceIds` / `chatapp.dismissedDeviceIds`. Filters the
  initial fetch by created_at > own-device's created_at so a freshly
  installed client doesn't try to "approve" pre-existing devices.
- New `components/DeviceApprovalBanner.tsx`: bottom-right Discord-style
  banner per pending request with Genehmigen / Ablehnen actions; reuses
  `wrapForOneDevice` from conversationKeySync to fan out conv-keys.
- AppShell mounts both the listener and the banner.

Plus dev userData isolation in main.ts: when running unpackaged, append
`-Dev` to the userData path so `pnpm dev` runs side-by-side with the
installed packaged build instead of colliding on the single-instance
lock. Window title also distinguished as "ChatApp (Dev)".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
byGalax
2026-05-07 17:03:04 +02:00
parent 950ef5b706
commit 9b764053c4
5 changed files with 531 additions and 43 deletions
+50 -41
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import { supabase } from './supabase';
// This fixes the "cannot decrypt" cliff for devices that registered while
// no other participant device was online to share the key with them.
interface SyncCtx {
export interface SyncCtx {
myUserId: string;
myDeviceId: string;
priv: Uint8Array;
@@ -32,46 +32,55 @@ export function startConversationKeySync(
ownUserId: string,
ownDeviceId: string,
): () => void {
let cancelled = false;
let priv: Uint8Array | null = null;
const dedupeKey = ownUserId + ':' + ownDeviceId;
void loadDevicePrivateKey(devLocalSecretStore, ownUserId, ownDeviceId).then(async (pk) => {
if (cancelled) return;
priv = pk;
if (!priv) return;
if (backfilledKey.has(dedupeKey)) return;
backfilledKey.add(dedupeKey);
await syncAllExistingGaps({ myUserId: ownUserId, myDeviceId: ownDeviceId, priv });
});
const channel = supabase
.channel('device-key-sync:' + ownDeviceId)
.on(
'postgres_changes',
{ event: 'INSERT', schema: 'public', table: 'devices' },
(payload: { new: { id?: string; user_id?: string; public_key?: string } }) => {
if (cancelled) return;
const row = payload.new;
if (!row?.id || !row.user_id || !row.public_key) return;
if (row.user_id === ownUserId && row.id === ownDeviceId) return;
if (!priv) return; // backfill on mount will catch it later
void wrapForOneDevice(
{ myUserId: ownUserId, myDeviceId: ownDeviceId, priv },
row.id,
row.user_id,
row.public_key,
);
},
)
.subscribe();
return () => {
cancelled = true;
void supabase.removeChannel(channel);
};
// DISABLED: auto-share of conversation keys to newly-registered devices
// is gone. Without it, account takeover (stolen password / new device
// registered by attacker) no longer automatically grants history access
// — an attacker would have a working device-key but no conv-key wraps.
//
// History access paths still supported:
// 1. Backup-Restore — restores the OLD device-id + privkey, so the
// server-side wraps for that device-id are accessible as before.
// 2. (Planned) Approval flow — existing device or conversation peer
// explicitly approves a new device, then conv-keys are wrapped
// for it. Until that ships, fresh-login-without-backup means old
// conversations stay encrypted.
//
// For NEW conversations: the key is generated at conv-creation time
// and includes all current devices of all members, so a freshly-logged-
// in device CAN still participate in newly-created conversations. It
// just can't read the back-history of conversations it wasn't a member
// of when those messages were sealed.
//
// We deliberately keep the helper functions below (syncAllExistingGaps,
// wrapForOneDevice, …) intact so the upcoming approval flow can wire
// them to user-driven triggers without rebuilding from scratch.
void ownUserId;
void ownDeviceId;
void backfilledKey;
void loadDevicePrivateKey;
void devLocalSecretStore;
void supabase;
return () => {};
}
// Keep helpers alive across the auto-sync hibernation window so the
// upcoming approval flow can re-wire them. Without this no-op reference
// `tsc --noEmit` flags them as unused (TS6133).
//
// `wrapForOneDevice` and `syncOneConversationGaps` are exported below for
// the device-approval module — once the user explicitly approves a new
// device the approval flow re-uses these helpers to wrap conv-keys for
// that specific deviceId.
void (() => {
void listMyConversationIds;
void listConversationDevices;
void listExistingKeyRecipients;
void getActiveKeyVersion;
void syncAllExistingGaps;
void isExpectedShareFailure;
void rawFrom;
});
async function listMyConversationIds(myUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('conversation_members')
@@ -149,7 +158,7 @@ async function syncAllExistingGaps(ctx: SyncCtx): Promise<void> {
}
}
async function syncOneConversationGaps(ctx: SyncCtx, convId: string): Promise<void> {
export async function syncOneConversationGaps(ctx: SyncCtx, convId: string): Promise<void> {
const version = await getActiveKeyVersion(convId);
const devices = await listConversationDevices(convId);
if (devices.length === 0) return;
@@ -200,7 +209,7 @@ function isExpectedShareFailure(err: unknown): boolean {
);
}
async function wrapForOneDevice(
export async function wrapForOneDevice(
ctx: SyncCtx,
newDeviceId: string,
newDeviceUserId: string,
+276
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
import type { DevicePlatform } from '@chat-app/shared/supabase';
import { type SyncCtx, wrapForOneDevice } from './conversationKeySync';
import { supabase } from './supabase';
// Device-approval flow (Phase 1).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// When the user registers a brand-new device on top of an existing one, the
// existing device must explicitly approve it before any conv-key wraps are
// created. This module:
//
// 1. On startup, fetches every device row owned by the user and surfaces
// the ones that aren't this device, aren't already approved, and aren't
// dismissed. Covers the "I was offline when the new device registered"
// case.
// 2. Subscribes to realtime INSERTs on `devices` for the user's id, so a
// device that registers WHILE this client is online raises a banner
// immediately.
// 3. Persists approve/deny decisions in localStorage so a reload doesn't
// ask again for a device the user already answered for.
//
// Approval call: re-uses `wrapForOneDevice` from conversationKeySync — that
// helper already walks every shared conversation and writes the key bundle
// for the target device.
export interface PendingApproval {
deviceId: string;
userId: string;
name: string;
platform: DevicePlatform | string;
createdAt: string;
publicKey: string; // pg-hex-encoded bytea
}
export interface DeviceApprovalListenerCtx {
ownUserId: string;
ownDeviceId: string;
// Lazy getter so we never hold the privkey in memory for longer than the
// approve action that needs it. Returns null if the key isn't loadable
// (e.g. fresh-restored device that hasn't unsealed yet).
getPriv: () => Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
}
const APPROVED_KEY = 'chatapp.approvedDeviceIds';
const DISMISSED_KEY = 'chatapp.dismissedDeviceIds';
// In-process state. Module-level so the banner component and the listener
// share one source of truth without prop-drilling through context.
let pending: PendingApproval[] = [];
const subscribers = new Set<(list: PendingApproval[]) => void>();
let listenerCtx: DeviceApprovalListenerCtx | null = null;
function readIdSet(key: string): Set<string> {
try {
const raw = window.localStorage.getItem(key);
if (!raw) return new Set();
const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(raw);
if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) return new Set();
return new Set(parsed.filter((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string'));
} catch {
return new Set();
}
}
function writeIdSet(key: string, set: Set<string>): void {
try {
window.localStorage.setItem(key, JSON.stringify([...set]));
} catch {
/* storage unavailable — non-fatal */
}
}
function persistApproved(deviceId: string): void {
const s = readIdSet(APPROVED_KEY);
s.add(deviceId);
writeIdSet(APPROVED_KEY, s);
}
function persistDismissed(deviceId: string): void {
const s = readIdSet(DISMISSED_KEY);
s.add(deviceId);
writeIdSet(DISMISSED_KEY, s);
}
function notify(): void {
const snapshot = [...pending];
for (const cb of subscribers) {
try {
cb(snapshot);
} catch (err) {
console.warn('deviceApproval: subscriber threw', err);
}
}
}
export function getPendingApprovals(): PendingApproval[] {
return [...pending];
}
export function subscribePendingApprovals(
cb: (list: PendingApproval[]) => void,
): () => void {
subscribers.add(cb);
// Fire once with current state so the consumer can initialise without
// waiting for the next change.
try {
cb([...pending]);
} catch (err) {
console.warn('deviceApproval: initial subscriber call threw', err);
}
return () => {
subscribers.delete(cb);
};
}
function shouldSurface(deviceId: string, ownDeviceId: string): boolean {
if (deviceId === ownDeviceId) return false;
const approved = readIdSet(APPROVED_KEY);
if (approved.has(deviceId)) return false;
const dismissed = readIdSet(DISMISSED_KEY);
if (dismissed.has(deviceId)) return false;
return true;
}
interface DeviceRowLite {
id: string;
user_id: string;
name: string;
platform: DevicePlatform | string;
created_at: string;
public_key: string;
}
function rowToPending(row: DeviceRowLite): PendingApproval {
return {
deviceId: row.id,
userId: row.user_id,
name: row.name,
platform: row.platform,
createdAt: row.created_at,
publicKey: row.public_key,
};
}
function upsertPending(req: PendingApproval): void {
if (pending.some((p) => p.deviceId === req.deviceId)) return;
pending = [...pending, req];
notify();
}
function removePending(deviceId: string): void {
const next = pending.filter((p) => p.deviceId !== deviceId);
if (next.length === pending.length) return;
pending = next;
notify();
}
async function loadInitialPending(ctx: DeviceApprovalListenerCtx): Promise<void> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('devices')
.select('id, user_id, name, platform, created_at, public_key')
.eq('user_id', ctx.ownUserId);
if (error) {
console.warn('deviceApproval: initial devices lookup failed', error);
return;
}
const rows = (data ?? []) as DeviceRowLite[];
// Find OWN device's createdAt — anything older than that is a pre-existing
// device that was already legit before this client came online and should
// NOT raise an approval banner. Without this guard, a freshly-installed
// client lights up with one banner per pre-existing device of the user
// ("zich messages zur freigabe") which is the opposite of what we want:
// approval makes sense on the OLDER device judging the NEWER one, never
// the other way round.
const own = rows.find((r) => r.id === ctx.ownDeviceId);
const ownCreatedAt = own ? Date.parse(own.created_at) : Number.NEGATIVE_INFINITY;
for (const row of rows) {
if (!shouldSurface(row.id, ctx.ownDeviceId)) continue;
const rowCreatedAt = Date.parse(row.created_at);
if (Number.isFinite(rowCreatedAt) && rowCreatedAt <= ownCreatedAt) {
// Older / equal-age device — auto-treat as already approved on this
// side so it never re-prompts (covers reloads + future fetches).
persistApproved(row.id);
continue;
}
upsertPending(rowToPending(row));
}
}
// Starts the approval listener for the given user/device. Returns an
// unsubscribe function — call it on shell unmount to tear down the realtime
// channel and clear in-memory state.
export function startDeviceApprovalListener(
ctx: DeviceApprovalListenerCtx,
): () => void {
listenerCtx = ctx;
void loadInitialPending(ctx);
const channel = supabase
.channel(`device-approval:${ctx.ownUserId}`)
.on(
'postgres_changes',
{
event: 'INSERT',
schema: 'public',
table: 'devices',
filter: `user_id=eq.${ctx.ownUserId}`,
},
(payload: { new: Record<string, unknown> }) => {
const row = payload.new as unknown as DeviceRowLite;
if (!row?.id) return;
if (!shouldSurface(row.id, ctx.ownDeviceId)) return;
upsertPending(rowToPending(row));
},
)
.subscribe();
return () => {
void supabase.removeChannel(channel).catch(() => {
/* ignore — channel might already be gone */
});
pending = [];
listenerCtx = null;
notify();
};
}
// Approves a pending device: walks every conversation the current user is
// in and writes a conv-key bundle for the new device. On success the request
// is removed from the pending list and the deviceId is persisted in
// localStorage so a reload doesn't re-prompt.
export async function approveDevice(req: PendingApproval): Promise<void> {
const ctx = listenerCtx;
if (!ctx) {
throw new Error('deviceApproval: listener not started');
}
if (req.userId !== ctx.ownUserId) {
// Phase 1 only handles same-user approvals (own new device). Friend-side
// approval is a later phase.
throw new Error('deviceApproval: cross-user approval not supported yet');
}
const priv = await ctx.getPriv();
if (!priv) {
throw new Error('deviceApproval: own private key unavailable');
}
const sync: SyncCtx = {
myUserId: ctx.ownUserId,
myDeviceId: ctx.ownDeviceId,
priv,
};
try {
await wrapForOneDevice(sync, req.deviceId, req.userId, req.publicKey);
} finally {
// Wipe the priv copy we asked for. The original lives in the secret
// store; this is the transient working copy.
for (let i = 0; i < priv.length; i++) priv[i] = 0;
}
persistApproved(req.deviceId);
removePending(req.deviceId);
}
// Denies a pending device: just remembers the deviceId in the dismissed-set
// and removes the request. No server-side change — the new device simply
// stays without any conv-key wraps until the user changes their mind (e.g.
// from a settings screen later).
export function denyDevice(deviceId: string): void {
persistDismissed(deviceId);
removePending(deviceId);
}