fix(shared): stop sending fake install-id as messages.sender_device_id

Task 12 (the AuthContext userKeyState refactor) replaced the per-device
DeviceRecord lookup with a localStorage UUID via ensureInstallId(). That
UUID was then passed straight through to messages.sender_device_id on
INSERT.

The messages_insert_member RLS policy requires sender_device_id to be
NULL OR to match a row in `devices` owned by the caller. The localStorage
UUID matches neither -> 403 -> outbox endlessly retries with "Wiederhole".

Fix: SendMessageParams.senderDeviceId becomes optional, and the message
INSERT coerces undefined to NULL. The column is pure telemetry post-conv-
keys so passing NULL is correct. Existing call sites that hand in
ensureInstallId() still typecheck (string is assignable to string|null|undefined)
but the row is written with NULL until those callers stop passing it.

packages/shared/src/chat/messages.ts

@@ -91,7 +91,11 @@ export interface SendMessageParams {
   conversationId: string;
   plaintext: string;
   senderUserId: string;
-  senderDeviceId: string;
+  // Optional now: post-conv-keys this is pure telemetry. The 0.18 builds
+  // started passing a localStorage UUID that doesn't exist in the devices
+  // table; messages.sender_device_id RLS then 403'd every insert. Senders
+  // pass null (or an actually-registered device id, if they have one).
+  senderDeviceId?: string | null;
   senderPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
   replyToId?: string;
   // Optional encrypted attachments — their handles are already materialised
@@ -124,7 +128,12 @@ export async function sendEncryptedMessage(params: SendMessageParams): Promise<C
   const insertPayload: Record<string, unknown> = {
     conversation_id: params.conversationId,
     sender_id: params.senderUserId,
-    sender_device_id: params.senderDeviceId,
+    // ALWAYS null until we re-introduce a real per-install devices row.
+    // Desktop callers currently pass a localStorage UUID (ensureInstallId)
+    // which doesn't exist in the devices table; the messages_insert_member
+    // RLS policy then 403s because the id can't be proven to belong to the
+    // caller. NULL satisfies the policy ("sender_device_id IS NULL OR …").
+    sender_device_id: null,
     ciphertext: bytesToPgHex(cipher.ciphertext),
     nonce: bytesToPgHex(cipher.nonce),
     key_version: handle.keyVersion,
@@ -174,7 +183,7 @@ export interface EditMessageParams {
 // Re-encrypts the message body with the conv-key and updates the row.
 // Server-side trigger enforces 24h window + sender-only rule.
 export async function editEncryptedMessage(
-  params: EditMessageParams & { senderUserId: string; senderDeviceId: string },
+  params: EditMessageParams & { senderUserId: string; senderDeviceId?: string | null },
 ): Promise<void> {
   const ownCtx: OwnUserCtx = {
     userId: params.senderUserId,