Files
ChatApp/apps/desktop/src/lib/conversationKeySync.ts
T
byGalax 9b764053c4 feat(crypto): explicit device-approval flow + dev userData isolation
Disable the previous auto-share of conversation keys to newly-registered
devices: a stolen password / new device registered by an attacker no
longer automatically grants history access. Backup-Restore (which
restores the old device-id) still opens existing wraps as before.

Phase 1 of the approval replacement:
- New `lib/deviceApproval.ts`: realtime listener for `devices` INSERT,
  surfaces a pending list, persists approve/deny decisions in
  `chatapp.approvedDeviceIds` / `chatapp.dismissedDeviceIds`. Filters the
  initial fetch by created_at > own-device's created_at so a freshly
  installed client doesn't try to "approve" pre-existing devices.
- New `components/DeviceApprovalBanner.tsx`: bottom-right Discord-style
  banner per pending request with Genehmigen / Ablehnen actions; reuses
  `wrapForOneDevice` from conversationKeySync to fan out conv-keys.
- AppShell mounts both the listener and the banner.

Plus dev userData isolation in main.ts: when running unpackaged, append
`-Dev` to the userData path so `pnpm dev` runs side-by-side with the
installed packaged build instead of colliding on the single-instance
lock. Window title also distinguished as "ChatApp (Dev)".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 17:03:04 +02:00

246 lines
8.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { loadDevicePrivateKey } from '@chat-app/shared/auth';
import { type OwnDeviceCtx, shareConvKeyToDevice } from '@chat-app/shared/chat';
import { pgHexToBytes } from '@chat-app/shared/supabase';
import { devLocalSecretStore } from './secretStore';
import { supabase } from './supabase';
// Watches the `devices` table for new entries AND, on mount, scans every
// conversation we participate in for missing key bundles. Fills gaps by
// re-wrapping our active conv-key for the missing recipient devices.
//
// This fixes the "cannot decrypt" cliff for devices that registered while
// no other participant device was online to share the key with them.
export interface SyncCtx {
myUserId: string;
myDeviceId: string;
priv: Uint8Array;
}
// db-types is stale for `conversation_keys`/`active_key_version`; bypass.
function rawFrom(table: string) {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
return (supabase as unknown as { from: (t: string) => any }).from(table);
}
// Module-level flag — gap-fill runs once per (user, device) combo per
// process lifetime. Page reloads / route changes don't re-trigger it.
const backfilledKey = new Set<string>();
export function startConversationKeySync(
ownUserId: string,
ownDeviceId: string,
): () => void {
// DISABLED: auto-share of conversation keys to newly-registered devices
// is gone. Without it, account takeover (stolen password / new device
// registered by attacker) no longer automatically grants history access
// — an attacker would have a working device-key but no conv-key wraps.
//
// History access paths still supported:
// 1. Backup-Restore — restores the OLD device-id + privkey, so the
// server-side wraps for that device-id are accessible as before.
// 2. (Planned) Approval flow — existing device or conversation peer
// explicitly approves a new device, then conv-keys are wrapped
// for it. Until that ships, fresh-login-without-backup means old
// conversations stay encrypted.
//
// For NEW conversations: the key is generated at conv-creation time
// and includes all current devices of all members, so a freshly-logged-
// in device CAN still participate in newly-created conversations. It
// just can't read the back-history of conversations it wasn't a member
// of when those messages were sealed.
//
// We deliberately keep the helper functions below (syncAllExistingGaps,
// wrapForOneDevice, …) intact so the upcoming approval flow can wire
// them to user-driven triggers without rebuilding from scratch.
void ownUserId;
void ownDeviceId;
void backfilledKey;
void loadDevicePrivateKey;
void devLocalSecretStore;
void supabase;
return () => {};
}
// Keep helpers alive across the auto-sync hibernation window so the
// upcoming approval flow can re-wire them. Without this no-op reference
// `tsc --noEmit` flags them as unused (TS6133).
//
// `wrapForOneDevice` and `syncOneConversationGaps` are exported below for
// the device-approval module — once the user explicitly approves a new
// device the approval flow re-uses these helpers to wrap conv-keys for
// that specific deviceId.
void (() => {
void listMyConversationIds;
void listConversationDevices;
void listExistingKeyRecipients;
void getActiveKeyVersion;
void syncAllExistingGaps;
void isExpectedShareFailure;
void rawFrom;
});
async function listMyConversationIds(myUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('conversation_members')
.select('conversation_id')
.eq('user_id', myUserId)
.eq('accepted', true);
if (error) {
console.warn('keySync: own-member lookup failed', error);
return [];
}
return (data ?? []).map((r) => r.conversation_id as string);
}
async function listConversationDevices(
conversationId: string,
): Promise<{ id: string; user_id: string; public_key: string }[]> {
const { data: members, error: mErr } = await supabase
.from('conversation_members')
.select('user_id')
.eq('conversation_id', conversationId)
.eq('accepted', true);
if (mErr) {
console.warn('keySync: members lookup failed', mErr);
return [];
}
const userIds = (members ?? []).map((m) => m.user_id as string);
if (userIds.length === 0) return [];
const { data: devices, error: dErr } = await supabase
.from('devices')
.select('id, user_id, public_key')
.in('user_id', userIds);
if (dErr) {
console.warn('keySync: devices lookup failed', dErr);
return [];
}
return (devices ?? []) as { id: string; user_id: string; public_key: string }[];
}
async function listExistingKeyRecipients(
conversationId: string,
keyVersion: number,
): Promise<Set<string>> {
const { data, error } = await rawFrom('conversation_keys')
.select('recipient_device_id')
.eq('conversation_id', conversationId)
.eq('key_version', keyVersion);
if (error) {
console.warn('keySync: existing keys lookup failed', error);
return new Set();
}
return new Set((data ?? []).map((r: { recipient_device_id: string }) => r.recipient_device_id));
}
async function getActiveKeyVersion(conversationId: string): Promise<number> {
const { data, error } = await rawFrom('conversations')
.select('active_key_version')
.eq('id', conversationId)
.single();
if (error) {
console.warn('keySync: active key version lookup failed', error);
return 1;
}
return (data as { active_key_version: number }).active_key_version;
}
async function syncAllExistingGaps(ctx: SyncCtx): Promise<void> {
const convs = await listMyConversationIds(ctx.myUserId);
for (const convId of convs) {
try {
await syncOneConversationGaps(ctx, convId);
} catch (err: unknown) {
console.warn('keySync: conv gap sync failed', { convId, err });
}
}
}
export async function syncOneConversationGaps(ctx: SyncCtx, convId: string): Promise<void> {
const version = await getActiveKeyVersion(convId);
const devices = await listConversationDevices(convId);
if (devices.length === 0) return;
const recipients = await listExistingKeyRecipients(convId, version);
const ownCtx: OwnDeviceCtx = {
userId: ctx.myUserId,
deviceId: ctx.myDeviceId,
privateKey: ctx.priv,
};
for (const dev of devices) {
if (recipients.has(dev.id)) continue;
// Skip our own device — we already have the bundle if we're capable of
// sharing (or don't need it if we ourselves haven't been wrapped yet).
if (dev.id === ctx.myDeviceId) continue;
try {
await shareConvKeyToDevice(supabase, convId, dev.id, pgHexToBytes(dev.public_key), ownCtx);
} catch (err: unknown) {
// Backfill is best-effort. Most common silent failures:
// - tryGetConvKey couldn't unwrap (another peer will fill the gap).
// - RLS rejects because the recipient's owner is a pending (not-yet
// accepted) DM member, or was removed from the conv.
// Both are recoverable / expected, swallow without spam.
if (isExpectedShareFailure(err)) continue;
console.warn('keySync: shareConvKeyToDevice gap-fill failed', {
convId,
recipient: dev.id,
err,
});
}
}
}
function isExpectedShareFailure(err: unknown): boolean {
if (!err || typeof err !== 'object') return false;
const e = err as { message?: string; code?: string; details?: string; status?: number };
const code = (e.code ?? '').toString();
const status = e.status;
const haystack = (e.message ?? '') + ' ' + (e.details ?? '');
return (
status === 403 ||
code === '42501' || // postgres: insufficient_privilege (RLS)
code === '23505' || // unique_violation
haystack.includes('row-level security') ||
haystack.includes('does not have it yet') ||
haystack.includes('Forbidden')
);
}
export async function wrapForOneDevice(
ctx: SyncCtx,
newDeviceId: string,
newDeviceUserId: string,
newDevicePubHex: string,
): Promise<void> {
const myConvs = new Set(await listMyConversationIds(ctx.myUserId));
const { data: peerMember, error: pErr } = await supabase
.from('conversation_members')
.select('conversation_id')
.eq('user_id', newDeviceUserId);
if (pErr) {
console.warn('keySync: peer-member lookup failed', pErr);
return;
}
const sharedConvs = (peerMember ?? [])
.map((r) => r.conversation_id as string)
.filter((id) => myConvs.has(id));
if (sharedConvs.length === 0) return;
const newPub = pgHexToBytes(newDevicePubHex);
const ownCtx: OwnDeviceCtx = {
userId: ctx.myUserId,
deviceId: ctx.myDeviceId,
privateKey: ctx.priv,
};
for (const convId of sharedConvs) {
try {
await shareConvKeyToDevice(supabase, convId, newDeviceId, newPub, ownCtx);
} catch (err: unknown) {
console.warn('keySync: shareConvKeyToDevice failed', { convId, err });
}
}
}